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L THE CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS BROADER THAN THAT 
WHICH HAS BEEN NARROWLY DEFINED BY APPELLEE. 
As an equitable remedy, unjust enrichment should not be narrowly 
construed. "[T]he doctrine of unjust enrichment was specifically developed to 
address situations that did not fit within a particular legal standard but which 
nonetheless merited judicial intervention." Allen v. Hall 148 P.3d 939, 945 (Utah 
2006). 
Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines 
and remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich 
himself at the expense of another, but should be required to make 
restitution of or for the property or benefits received, retained, or 
appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, 
and where such action involves no violation or frustration of law or 
opposition, directly or indirectly, to public policy; unjust enrichment is 
defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the 
retention of money or property of another against the fundamental 
principles of justice or equity and good conscience. 
27 A.L.R.5th 719 § 2(a). The above description of unjust enrichment is 
persuasive as it relates to this case because Freddie Mac (and GMAC) received a 
large windfall as a result of being unjustly enriched by circumstances that are 
directly attributable to Mckay Dee Credit Union. Therefore, Freddie Mac should 
be required to return the benefit it received from McKay Dee Credit Union. 
"To prove ... unjust enrichment, appellant must show, among other things, 
that appellees received a benefit "under circumstances that would make it 
unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it." See, 
Geothermal Co. v. Far West Capital WL 463187 quoting Bailey-Allen Co, 
v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 189 (Utah Ct.App.1997) 
In this case, the circumstances make it absolutely unjust for Freddie Mac to 
retain the windfall that it obtained from Mckay Dee Credit Union. In reasonably 
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relying upon the information provided to them about the postponement of the 
trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to defend its second trust deed position and 
the Appellees were able to purchase the Property as the only bidder for the amount 
of $183,344.61. By their own admission the Appellees were able to then sell the 
Property for the approximate amount of $269,900.00. See, Bench Trial Transcript, 
p. 8, lines 3-7. Therefore, the benefit conferred upon the Appellees was the profit 
of $86,555.39 that Appellees received in selling the Property. 
Because the fact patterns in unjust enrichment cases are generally complex 
and varying, the court is afforded broad discretion with respect to determination 
that a set of facts does or does not warrant conclusion that unjust enrichment has 
been shown. See, Restatement of Restitution, Intro, n. (1937). In fact, the court 
in Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997) affirmed the trial 
court's award of one-half of the benefit received to be proper measure of damages 
in an unjust enrichment case. In other words, because unjust enrichment an 
equitable remedy, the court can apply equitable principles to make sure that an 
equitable result is obtained. 
While the courts have established that there are three elements of unjust 
enrichment, these elements are to be construed in an equitable light and to be 
liberally construed. For example, in Allen v. Hall 148 P.2d 939 (Utah 2006), the 
courted stated, "The facts underlying unjust enrichment claims vary greatly from 
case to case, and the doctrine of unjust enrichment was specifically developed to 
address situations that did not fit with any particular legal standard but which 
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nonetheless merited judicial intervention." Id. at. 945. This statement was given 
as guidance by the Utah Supreme Court to not construe narrowly the elements of 
unjust enrichment in order to achieve equity and justice. 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable principle and takes special note of 
misleading acts of the parties involved. 
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract between two 
others does not make such third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust 
enrichment, or restitution. There must be some misleading act, request for 
services, or the like, to support such an action. 
See, Knight v. Post 748 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct.App.1988) quoting 
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1977). 
A significantly misleading act is present in this case. In April of 2001, McKay Dee 
received a notice of trustee's sale from the first lienholder that the Property would 
be sold at trustee's sale on May 15, 2001. See Record, Plaintiffs Exhibit 12. 
McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in preparation 
to attend the trustee's sale and bid on the Property. See Bench Trial Transcript 
page 40. When McKay Dee called the sales line provided for in the notice of 
trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale McKay Dee was 
advised that the sale had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to be held at the same 
time and same location. See Bench Trial Transcript page 41. Again, McKay Dee 
prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check and attending the 
postponed sale on May 18, 2001. But nobody was at the sale. See Bench Trial 
Transcript pages 41-42. In reasonably relying upon the information provided to 
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them about the postponement of the trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to 
defend its position and the property was sold to the beneficiary of the first deed of 
trust. Thus, Freddie Mac acquired property as the only bidder for the amount of 
$183,344.61 (see Trustee's Deed p.2, Defendants Exhibit #1) when that property 
was worth at least $269,900.00, the amount of Freddie Mac's sale to a third party. 
Therefore, the benefit conferred upon Freddie Mac was the profit of $86,555.39 
that Appellants received in eventually selling the property. See Bench Trial 
Transcript page 15, lines 13-14. 
The trial court was concerned by the by the windfall received by Freddie 
Mac: 
"THE COURT: Well, and the other things is, I mean apparently Freddie 
Mac's the only one that shows up, they buy the property for 183,000 and 
turn around and sell it for 269 and again, I mean that's a windfall for 
Freddie Mac, right, 80 something thousand dollars? And I get the 
impression that it's okay for us to get that benefit. But, you know if you 
really want to sue somebody it's not us. We're not involved. It's 
somebody else's fault and again I'm struggling with this concept that it's 
okay for Freddie Mac to reap the benefits of this windfall, but we're not 
responsible for anything I mean it just - " See, Bench Trial Transcript page 
14, lines 10-20. 
Clearly the extra benefit received by Freddie Mac is bothersome to more than just 
the Appellant. 
With regard to the three elements of unjust enrichment, such are clearly met 
in this case. These elements include 1) a benefit conferred on one person by 
another; 2) appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and, 3) the 
acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as 
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to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its 
value. In this situation McKay Dee Credit Union conferred a benefit upon Freddie 
Mac and GMAC because Freddie Mac and GMAC not only obtained the value of 
McKay Dee Credit Union's second trust deed position in the subject property, they 
also obtained a substantial profit above and beyond that. The Appellees clearly 
knew of the benefit conferred upon them by McKay Dee Credit Union because 
they knew that they had purchased the property for the amount of the original loan 
that did not include any amounts to a second lien holder. First lienholders are very 
conscious of whether or not second lien holders attend a sale. The fact that certain 
equity may be available to the foreclosing party is always a part of the analysis. 
Finally, Freddie Mac and/or GMAC retained the benefit without payment to 
McKay Dee Credit Union of the value of the benefit. See, Bench Trial Transcript 
page 15, lines 13-14. The facts and circumstances show that Appellees benefited 
from this situation and the amount in excess of $86,000.00. That the benefit, upon 
Appellees by McKay Dee Credit Union's non-attendance at the actual sale which 
was induced by Appellants and their agent. Appellees received a benefit which 
directly results from McKay Dee's non-attendance at the sale and which was 
precipitated by the conduct of Appellees or its agent as to the misinformation of 
the postponed sale date. 
As to a potential wrongful foreclosure claim, such an argument is irrelevant 
because the Trustee who may have conducted a wrongful foreclosure is an agent 
of the Appellees and did not receive any of the benefit which was conferred upon 
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the Appellees. McKay Dee chose to prosecute its claim against the party who 
received the monetary benefit from the misinformation as to the postponed sale 
date. Moreover, the Appellees are responsible for the conduct of their agent at the 
sale and therefore it is irrelevant. In addition, it is also irrelevant that McKay Dee 
obtained a separate judgment against the Calls. Had McKay Dee not sought a 
judgment from the Calls, there would be a failure to mitigate argument. McKay 
Dee's causes of action as they relate to Appellees are independent and separate 
from the claims of which they have as they relate to the Calls. Moreover, the 
damages available against the Calls were limited by the amount of the promissory 
note. The damages which McKay Dee suffered as a result of Appellants' unjust 
enrichment are of significantly greater value. 
II . APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
RELATING TO THE CHALLENGED FINDING OF FACT. 
Appellee argues that McKay Dee must marshal the evidence regarding the 
trial court's finding of fact which is challenged. Finding of Fact number four 
states "it is not clear to this Court if Mr. Shirra wrote the wrong date for the sale 
down, or if GMAC provided the wrong date." See, Finding of Fact #4. The only 
evidence in the record which supports this conclusion is as follows: 
Q: "But it's also possible that you wrote down the incorrect date, correct?" 
A: "There is that possibility." 
See, Bench Trial Transcript, page 54, lines 21 to 23. 
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The testimony which the trial court had to be weighed against the above 
evidence and which the trial court apparently ignored is as follows: 
Mr. Shirra stated: "The sale date ended on this notice is May 15 of 2001, 
11:30 a.m. on that date both John and I attended the sell prepared to bid on the sale 
and as instructed we had a $5,000.00 certified check, to proceed with bidding on 
the sale. 
Q: "And what happened when you arrived at the sale?" 
A: "There was nobody there." 
Q: "When nobody was there, were you concerned?" 
A: "Can't say I was overly concerned. It happened several times before." 
Q: "What did you do after returning back to the office?" 
A: "Came back to the office, contacted the sale hotline, which again is 
advertised in this document. I was given the date that the sale was 
rescheduled for 5/18, May the 18th, which is three days later." 
Q: "And did you write that information on the Notice of Trustee Sale?" 
A: "I did. I have it noted here in my handwriting." 
Q: "Therefore, did you receive any notice of a sale to be held on May 18, 
2001?" 
A: "No, I didn't." 
Q: "Did you attend the sale that -
A: "I attended the sale on May the 18th at 11:30 a.m." 
Q: "And was anybody there?" 
A: "No" 
See, Bench Trial Transcript, page 40, lines 15 to Page 41, line 25. 
The fact that Mr. Shirra had later mentioned in the trial that it was 
"possible" that he wrote the wrong sale date down as a result of cross-examination 
is insufficient information for the court to conclude as it did. His explanation of a 
possibility was in terms of the context in which counsel put the question to him 
which was basically that anything is possible. However, it is clear from Mr. 
Shirra's direct examination that his best recollection is that he wrote down what 
information he was told on the sale line. 
Additional testimony contrary to findings of Fact #4 is as follows: 
Q: "Looking at Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 as well, there's handwriting on that 
exhibit that indicates the sale date, or indicates the date of May 18, 
2001, Correct?" 
A: "Correct." 
Q: "And that's your handwriting, Correct?" 
A: "It is." 
Q: "Is it possible that you could have written down the incorrect date for 
the sale?" 
A: "I wrote that down and so I got it from the sale line." 
See, Bench Trial Transcript, page 54, lines 5 through 15. 
The trial court did not properly weigh the evidence based upon the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. Preponderance of the evidence means 
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whichever evidence is of the greater weight and which is most convincing and 
satisfactory. See, MUJI 2.18. When the evidence submitted by Mr. Shirra that he 
recalls hearing the sale line tell him that the date was May 18th is weighed against 
his statement upon cross-examination that it was merely possible that something 
else could have happened, the better conclusion is that which is contained in his 
direct examination. Because this is the only evidence weighing against Mr. 
Shirra's direct testimony, it should not carry the greatest weight. The evidence is 
the record does not show Mr. Shirra's prior testimony should be completely 
discounted by the court based merely upon a question presented on cross-
examination which was not developed any further. 
Because the only evidence which could possibly support the Court's 
Finding of Fact #4 is Mr. Shirra's testimony that it was possible he wrote the 
wrong date down rather than heard it wrong, Appellant has sufficiently marshaled 
the evidence. That statement which was mentioned in Appellant's Opening Brief 
satisfied McKay Dee's burden to marshal. See, West Valley City v. Majestic 
INV. CO. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). That is the only scrap of 
evidence which purportedly supports Finding of Fact #4. When all of the evidence 
is concerned relating to this issue, it is clear that Mr. Shirra's best recollection was 
that he did hear the information from the sales line, not the remote possibility that 
he might have written down the wrong date. In any event, it is also very important 
to note that Appellees did not submit any evidence to the contrary relating to Mr. 
Shirra's testimony. There was no evidence that came in at the trial court to 
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contradict Mr. Shirra's best recollection regarding the information he received 
from the sale line. 
In addition, there is no contrary evidence that was submitted by Defendants 
at the trial to contradict the testimony of Mr. Shirra as to his best recollection of 
having written down that information upon being told by the sale line. Appellees 
assert that the Trustee actually came to the sale location and postponed the sale on 
May 15, 2001. See, Appellees' Brief page 3. However, the Appellees did not 
submit any evidence which supports the assertion that the Trustee actually did 
attend the sale to postpone it. Appellants burden at trial was to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the validity of the facts supporting their claims. 
Clearly the statement that it was a "possibility" fits within the scope of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Mr. Shirra's statement of a possibility 
does not reduce the fact that the McKay Dee Credit Union had met its burden to 
show that it was more likely than not that the wrong sale date was given by the 
sale telephone line. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, unjust enrichment is an equitable theory which should be 
applied in a flexible manner. The Appellees received a substantial benefit from 
McKay Dee Credit Union as a result of McKay Dee Credit Union's non-
attendance at the sale which was precipitated by the wrong information set forth 
by Appellees' agent. Appellant respectfully requests that the court apply equitable 
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principles in this matter to remand this case to the trial court to reverse the 
findings of the trial court to conform to the evidence and to apply properly the 
unjust enrichment case law. 
DATED this S^ day of February, 200* 
^ O n^\ 
Darin Hammc 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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ADDENDUM 
BENCH TRIAL TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS A 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF EXCERPT B 
FINDING OF FACT EXCERPT C 
TRUSTEE'S DEED P. 2 D 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 12 E 
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1 Memorandum in Opposition that this profit is the benefit 
2 conferred upon the defendants - that the benefit conferred 
3 upon the Defendants was $86,000. But the key for the, for 
4 our summary judgment motion purposes is plaintiff did not pay 
5 this amount to the defendants and this is admitted in its 
6 Memorandum in Opposition. This amount, this $86,000, if this 
7 is the benefit, because I really don't understand what the 
8 benefit is, this amount was paid by a third party purchaser, 
9 not the plaintiff. Based on that, Plaintiff can't argue that 
10 it conferred a benefit upon the defendants and again, the 
11 summary judgment should be issued. 
12 Further, pursuant to Rule 56 and as stated earlier, 
13 we began by looking at the pleadings. Now we can look at the 
14 depositions and Affidavits of Plaintiff to show that no 
15 benefit was conferred by the plaintiff upon the defendants. 
16 Plaintiff in this Motion for Summary Judgment has failed to 
17 show any evidence or support in its Memorandum in Opposition 
18 that plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendants. In 
19 our Motion for Summary Judgment defendants filed Affidavits 
20 by Freddie Mac and GMAC supporting the fact that plaintiff 
21 did not confer a benefit upon them. However, we look at the 
22 Affidavit of Mr. Cameron Shirra, the Affidavit filed by 
23 Plaintiff in Support of its Motion for Opposition, nowhere is 
24 it mentioned or asserted in this Affidavit that plaintiff 
25 conferred a benefit upon the defendants. It says nothing to 
1 admissions they've, they've only alleged one cause of action 
2 against GMAC and Freddie Mac- They've alleged a separate 
3 cause of action against First American Title Insurance 
4 Agency, the Trustee, but they have not been served. 
5 If they need to dismiss this case and file a 
6 separate action, maybe that's what they need to do. But by 
7 their own admissions they've only alleged one cause of action 
8 against GMAC and Freddie Mac. They haven't, and like I said 
9 they haven't served First American Title Insurance Agency. 
10 THE COURT: Well, and the other thing is, I mean 
11 apparently Freddie Mac's the only one that shows up, they buy 
12 the property for 183,000 and turn around and sell it for 269 
13 and again, I mean that's a windfall for Freddie Mac, right, 
14 80 something thousand dollars? And I get the impression that 
15 it's okay for us to get that benefit. But, you know if you 
16 really want to sue somebody it's not us. We're not involved. 
17 It's somebody else's fault and again I'm struggling with this 
18 concept that it's okay for Freddie Mac to reap the benefits 
19 of this windfall, but we're not responsible for anything. I 
20 mean it just -
21 MR. DEHAAN: It is a windfall. It is a benefit. I 
22 think under the foreclosure rules that's allowed. They 
23 follow every statutory -
24 THE COURT: [inaudible] but Mr. Hammond's going to 
25 tell us, you know, if we got it right, if we'd known when the 
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1 day of the sale is we'd have been there to bid on that 
2 property too, and I don't know maybe they would have outbid 
3 Freddie Mac. I don't know. 
4 MR. DEHAAN: Yeah, that's what their argument is. 
5 THE COURT: Shouldn't they have been given the 
6 opportunity to be there? 
7 MR. DEHAAN: That's what their argument is. But 
8 like I said, there's no finding for wrongful foreclosure 
9 filed against GMAC Mortgage or Freddie Mac by plaintiff's own 
10 admissions. 
11 In addition, even if we were to go there the 
12 windfall, I'm confused as to what benefit plaintiffs 
13 conferred upon the defendants. The windfall, the $86,000 
14 profit, wasn't paid by the plaintiff. It was paid by a third 
15 party purchaser. I don't see how they can come in and say 
16 because you received this profit we, although we didn't pay 
17 it, you should pay us for, for the loss that we have, despite 
18 the fact that we've already got a judgment against the 
19 borrower's for $25,000. The Supreme Court under an unjust 
20 enrichment claim says, you know, it's an equitable remedy, 
21 unjust enrichment. It's when no other remedies sort of fit 
22 the fact matter. 
23 Here there's a breach of contract claim already 
24 been filed and entered in favor of the plaintiff and they've 
25 collected probably close to $20,000 on this. 
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1 attended? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Did you do anything else to identify whether or not 
4 the sale had been conducted, other than contact the 
5 telephone, that telephone number? 
6 A Well, as I indicated, I think I was informed that 
7 we would be notified when it was rescheduled so we just 
8 received payments and continued on with the loan. 
9 Q Okay, would you now take a look at Exhibit 12? Can 
10 you identify that document for the record? 
11 A It is another Notice of Trustee Sale. It's dated 
12 April 12th, of 2001. 
13 Q And what did you do when you received that Notice 
14 of Sale? 
15 A The sale date ended on this Notice is May 15th of 
16 2001, 11:30 a.m. On that date both John and I attended the 
17 sale prepared to bid on the sale and as instructed we had a 
18 $5,000 check, certified check, to proceed with bidding on the 
19 sale. 
20 Q And what happened when you arrived at the sale? 
21 A There was nobody there. 
22 Q When nobody was there, were you concerned? 
23 A Can't say I was overly concerned. It had happened 
24 J several times before. 
Q What did you do after returning back to the office? 
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1 A Came back to the office, contacted the sale 
2 hotline, which again is advertised in this document. I was 
3 given the date that the sale was rescheduled for 5/18, May 
4 the 18th, which is three days later. 
5 Q And did you write that information on the Notice of 
6 Trustee's Sale? 
7 A I did. I have it noted here in my handwriting. 
8 Q So the date 5/15 of x01 has been circled? 
9 A 5/15/01 has been circled. I'd drawn a line out to 
10 the side and written the date 5/18/01. 
11 Q Did you write the - any new time down? 
12 A No, I didn't write a time down on it. 
13 Q Why not? 
14 A I just, at the time assumed I would be prepared and 
15 go to the sale on 5/18 at the same time. 
16 Q Did the hotline tell you that it would be held at 
17 the same time of day? 
18 A It must have. 
19 Q Therefore, did you receive any written notice of a 
20 sale to be held on May 18th, 2001? 
21 A No, I didn't. 
22 Q Did you attend the sale that -
23 A I attended that sale on May the 18th at 11:30 a.m. 
24 Q And was anybody there? 
25 I A No. 
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1 Q What did you do when nobody was there at that sale? 
2 A I returned to the credit union. I don't have the 
3 notes that I contacted the sale line or anything, however, 
4 the Call's had been making payments to the loan. I had 
5 received two payments to the loan that date. I assumed that 
6 it had been worked out with the Call's again and the loan was 
7 proceeding forth as before. 
8 Q Did the Call's tell you that the loan had been 
9 worked out? 
10 A I remember a conversation with David in which he 
11 said that he had worked out an agreement with them. 
12 Q Would you take a look at Exhibit 13, please? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Can you identify that document for the Court? 
15 A It is a check issued by the credit union and 
16 stamped as a certified check. It is dated 5/15/01. It is 
17 the check that I prepared to go to the sale on that date of 
18 5/15/01. 
19 Q And -
20 A It's in the amount of $5,000. 
21 Q Did you use that check? 
22
 A When the sale did not take place I did not use the 
23 J check. On the endorsement of the check I have written a 
notation "not used for purposes intended" and I would just 
re-process the check through our system to show that it was 
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24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
the sale, 
attending 
A 
Q 
handwritii 
indicates 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
incorrect 
A 
line. 
Q 
On those dates and times, yes. 
And then you testified earlier that you attended 
when in fact you have no recollection of actually 
the sale on May 15th, 2001; is that your testimony? 
That is, that is what I said. 
Looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 as well, there's 
ig on that exhibit that indicates the sale date, or 
the date of May 18th, 2001, correct? 
Correct. 
And that's your handwriting, correct? 
It is. 
Is it possible that you could have written down the 
date for the sale? 
I wrote that down and so I got it from the sale 
I understand where you got it. Is it possible you 
wrote down an incorrect date? 
A 
as the po. 
Q 
I would say that there, any possibility. The same 
ssibility of them having the wrong date. 
That's right, it's possible that that's the correct 
date. But it's also possible that you wrote down the 
incorrect 
A 
Q 
A 
date, correct? 
There is that possibility. 
And that date is handwritten by you, correct? 
That'is right, uh-huh (affirmative). 
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The testimony of McKay Dee's primary witness, Mr. Shirra, was inconsistent and 
contradictory. For example, under direct examination Mr. Shirra stated that he attended 
the foreclosure sale on May 15, 2001. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 40. However, in 
his deposition and under cross examination, Mr. Shirra admitted that he could not say 
whether he went to the sale on that date. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript pp. 52-53. In fact, 
in view of his testimony that he called the foreclosure trustee's bid line on that date, it is 
unlikely that he attended the sale. If he had, he would have heard the Trustee postponing 
the sale and known that the sale was to be held on May 17, 2001. He would not have had 
to call the hotline if he had heard the postponement of the sale on May 15, 2001. 
This inability to accurately remember dates is important because it bolsters the 
admission Mr. Shirra made on cross examination. His testimony at trial under direct 
examination was that, when he called the sale hotline on May 15, 2001, he was given the 
date of May 18, 2001 as the new date for the foreclosure sale. R. 303, Bench Trial 
Transcript p. 41. However, when cross examined, Mr. Shirra admitted that he may have 
written down the wrong date. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. McKay Dee failed to 
mention this inconsistency and explain its importance to Mr. Shirra's admission on cross 
examination. Since this was important evidence bearing on the question of whether the 
trial court's finding was in error, and it was not marshaled by McKay Dee, McKay Dee 
failed in its duty to comprehensively present every scrap of evidence introduced at trial 
that supported the trial court's findings. 
3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The mortgage foreclosure sale was originally set for May 15, 2001. McKay Dee 
Credit Union personnel believed the date of sale was moved to May 18, 2001. Mr. 
Shirra, Vice-President of McKay Dee Credit Union, called the sale telephone line and 
wrote down the date of May 18, 2001 on the Notice of Trustee's Sale. 
2. Mr. Shirra testified that he thought the date of the foreclosure sale was May 18, 
2001, but admitted on cross-examination that it was possible he wrote the wrong sale date 
down. 
3. The foreclosure sale was actually held on May 17, 2001. 
4. It is not clear to this Court if Mr. Shirra wrote the wrong date for the sale down, or 
if GMAC provided the wrong date. 
5. The Court finds the Plaintiff conferred no benefit on Defendants. 
6. Plaintiff did not pay money or provide any benefit directly to Defendants. 
Plaintiff paid nothing to the Defendants. 
7. Any benefit received by Defendants was conferred by Defendant's own effort in 
completing the foreclosure sale. 
8. The Court finds that it is speculation on the part of Plaintiff that it would have 
received any excess proceeds. 
9. There is no way to determine if Plaintiff would have prevailed at the foreclosure 
sale in any event, and no way to determine if Plaintiff would have been the successful 
2 
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WHEREAS, the successor Trustee did, at the time and place of sale, then and there sell, at public 
auction to Grantee above named, being the highest bidder thereof, the property described, for the sum of 
$133,344.61 
NOW, THEREFORE, the successor Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited and of the 
sum above mentioned bid and paid by Grantee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and by 
virtue of the authority in him, by said Trust Deed, GRANT AND CONVEY unto Grantee above named, 
but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied, all that certain property situate in WEBER 
County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 37, HIGHLANDS BLUFF ESTATES SUBDIVISION. PHASE 4, WEBER 
COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF. 
07-398-0001 
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, 
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property 
Date: May 22, 2001 First -\mencan Title Insurance Agencv, [nc 
Successor Trustee 
LM 
By Tim A Krueger 
Its Director of Foreclosure,TIEO 
State of Utah ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the May 22. 2001, personally appeared before me, Tim A. Krueger who being duly sworn did :>ay, that he, the said Tim \. 
Krueger, is the Director of Foreclosure/KEO of First \mencan Title Insurance Agencv, Inc , the corporation that executed 
the foregoing instrument as Successor Trustee, by authonty of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said Tim \ . Krueger 
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same as Successor Trustee 
Notary Public " 1 
DANIELM.SPENDLOVE , 
330 East 4th South I 
Satt Lake Gty.Utan 84111 . 
My Commission Exoiras | 
SeptemwrH 2004 
State of Utah I 
Notarv Puolic 
EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC. 
15455 SAN FERNANDO MISSION BLVD 
SUITE #208 
MISSION HILLS, CA 91345 # / ^ 
T.S.# UT-52410-C 
Loan #010621662 
Title Order # 563538 
< ; • 
>$ 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described real property will be sol^at public auction to the highest bidder payable in 
lawful money of the United States AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 2525 
GRANT AVE., OGDEN, UT 84401, ^Jn5/20^^ 11:30 AM for the purpose of foreclosing a Trust Deed 
dated 1/31/96 and executed by D A V I E H T T ^ X T A N D JULIE S. CALL HUSBAND AND WIFE in favor of 
BANK OF UTAH, covering the following real property located in WEBER County: 
ALL OF LOT 37, HIGHLANDS BLUFF ESTATES SUBDIVISION. PHASE 4, WEBER COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING 
TO THE OFFICIAL PL^T THEREOF. 
A.P.N. 07-398-0001 
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property and all easements, appurtenances 
and fixtures now and hereafter a part of the property 
The address of the property is purported to be 2058 EAST 6225 SOUTH 
SOUTH OGDEN, UTAH 84403. The undersigned disclaims liability for any error in the addre'ss. The present 
owners reported to be DAVID R. CALL-and JULIE S. CALL. 
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the trustee $5,000.00 at the sale and the balance of the purchase 
price by 12:00 noon the day following the sale. Both payments must be in the form of a cashier's check or 
certified_funds. Cash is not acceptable, 
IJaleTii^^ 
Dated. April 12, 2001 FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC. 
irector-Foreclosure & REO 
THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT, AND 
ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. 
pQQ&fHt± 
